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I. Introduction 
 As part of the design of its future building, the University of Tennessee nuclear 
engineering department intends to incorporate a variety of nuclear engineering and nuclear 
science laboratories to advance the department’s research, as well as its educational capabilities. 
Included in these intended laboratories are a wet chemistry laboratory, materials characterization 
laboratory, linear accelerator facility, physical security laboratory, critical experiment facility, 
and more. For our group’s senior design project, we were tasked with designing a facility or 
group of facilities that could house the future linear accelerator, neutron generator, and 
irradiation area. Beyond this general description, our facility must be able to stand up to the 
usage needs for the department, provide adequate shielding to protect the users and general 
public, be cost effective, and provide the potential for future upgrades. Each one of these tasks 
provide their own design challenges. When combined, these tasks create a project environment 
that allows for a wide range of engineering skills to be tested (project management, drafting, 
dose calculations, computer simulations, etc.).  
 
 
Figure 1: Initial room layouts provided by the nuclear engineering faculty, showing possible 
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 Shown in Figure 1 are the critical facility/graphite pile, physical security research 
laboratory, and accelerator room (along with additional departmental facilities). The linear 
accelerator facility will include the 9MV Varian materials linear accelerator and accelerator 
control room. The physical security laboratory will include an irradiation area with high bay 
doors to allow for truck access. The critical experiment facility will include a NASA critical 
experiment, graphite pile, and DT neutron generator. These three laboratories are interconnected 
in their usage and will be physically connected with conduits through which radiation will be 
directed for imaging, materials characterization, amongst other usages.  
 From the geometrical layout (Figure 1) provided by the department, we had to adapt the 
facility design to further suit the needs of the individual faculty members and provide a shielding 
analysis for the design. This adaptation consisted of considering known design parameters and 
anticipating design parameters that could easily change. These design parameters included: the 
allotted size of facilities, the energy of linear accelerator, the possible addition of a DT neutron 
generator, the space needed for experiments, the type of experiments, and more. A majority of 
the design process was devoted to weighing these considerations and creating a layout to best 
suit facility needs. To provide a more robust facility, we decided to shield for a higher energy 
linear accelerator, a 22 MV linear accelerator that could be bought at a later time. By shielding 
for this higher energy linear accelerator, we will take into account the lower energy radiation of 
the 9 MV linear accelerator, while limiting the amount of retrofitting that would need to be done 
with the implementation of future upgrades. 
 The shielding analysis was done in as two part calculation method. The first being an 
analytical solution based on regulation guidelines set by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) and the state of Tennessee and described in detail by the National Council on Radiation 
Protection and Measurements (NCRP) reports 144 [2] and 151 [3] (auxiliary support for the 
analytical NCRP methods was taken from McGinley’s Shielding Techniques for Radiation 
Oncology Facilities [1]). The second being an MCNP simulation of the floor plan (Figure 2, 
derived from the NCRP methods) and source. From the simulation, doses in occupied spaces 
were determined. These doses were then compared against governing regulations to verify that 
dose limits were not exceeded. 
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Figure 2: CAD drawing of intended room layout for the 
accelerator and physical security research facilities after 
initial calculations were done with the NCRP methods.   
 
Due to the complexity of the project, certain aspects had to be given more attention. The 
way this was decided on was based on the likelihood of events and the time that each task 
required. For the project, we chose to focus primarily on designing the facilities to allow the use 
of the primary radiation source, the 22 MV linear accelerator, as well as accounting for the 
special requirements that our departmental faculty requested. These tasks were given precedence 
over shielding for the neutron generator because of the certainty that the linear accelerator 
facility will be part of the future nuclear engineering building, whereas the neutron generator is 
an intended addition that would require additional shielding to be taken into account in the 
graphite pile/critical experiment facility and physical security laboratory. Our floor plan takes 
into account the neutron generator’s utilization with respect to the physical security laboratory, 
but a set of dose calculations through the use of NCRP analytical calculations and MCNP 
simulations will not be done at this time. In the “Future Works” section, we will address the next 
steps needed to be taken including: simulation considerations, possible floor plan modifications, 
amongst others. Throughout the duration of the project, the floor plan has continually developed; 
creating a group of facilities that could be a valuable addition to the future departmental building 
of the University of Tennessee, Department of Nuclear Engineering.  
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In this report, we will provide an account of the methods that were used in the design of 
the combined physical security and linear accelerator facility, a comparison of the methods, 
design considerations, a description of the calculations undertaken, a summary of results, a 
conclusion of the project, along with future works that need to be taken into consideration. The 
report is intended to serve as a reference for faculty members as they undertake the design of the 
new nuclear engineering building.  
II. Technical Approach 
a. NCRP methods 
Reports 144 and 151 of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements 
present recommendations and shielding calculation methods to aid in the shielding design of 
megavoltage (MV) x-ray and other radiation facilities. These reports offer recommendations that, 
if used correctly, should adequately meet the currently accepted standards of radiation protection. 
The purpose of these documents is to offer those performing a shielding analysis, a standard way 
to analytically calculate an effective amount of shielding. This shielding is split into several 
different categories: primary barriers, secondary barriers, mazes, and doors. 
Primary barriers are the barriers on which the primary beam is incident on. It is these 
barriers that the most intense radiation is incident, thus they are almost exclusively the thickest 
barriers of a facility. Primary barrier width must be at least the size of the primary beam on the 
barrier plus an additional foot on each side1. Medical linear accelerator facilities are generally 
smaller in their footprint, when comparing them to the facility that we are considering. This is 
due to the space needed in these facilities to accomplish their intended tasks. For medical linear 
accelerator facilities, this is to treat patients with radiation. For facilities such as ours, the tasks 
are varied and unpredictable. Thus there is a need for a larger source to surface distance, and 
consequently a wider primary barrier.  
Secondary barriers are all other barriers that radiation is incident on, whether that be 
through scattering events, from accelerator head leakage, or from secondary radiation. Shielding 
doors are typically a continuation of secondary shielding that allows radiation workers to have 
access to the radiation areas. Shielding doors, depending on the materials chosen, can be large 
(both in size and weight). To reduce the size of shielding doors, mazes can be used. Mazes are 
secondary barriers placed between the beam and access doors. Mazes limit the pathways of 
radiation from reaching areas to be protected, specifically these access doors. However, due to 
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the need of hallways and the additional shielding of the maze, this adds considerable square 
footage to a facility design. It is up to each facility to determine the layout which works best for 
them.  
Shielding is typically calculated utilizing radiation’s intrinsic 
1
𝑟2
 dose fall off and 
negative exponential attenuation. Due to the dependence of attenuation on materials, this does 
not lend itself to a general shielding calculation. For a simplified, more general shielding 
calculation, a set of transmission factor equations was developed to establish the necessary tenth 
value layers and consequently barrier thicknesses. This set of transmission factor equations is 
described in detail in both NCRP 144 and 151. Each barrier type has its own transmission factor 
formula with appropriate variables including but not limited to: shielding design goal, distance to 
be protected, workload, use factor, and occupancy factor. These equations and variables, are 
based on experience and expected operation; taking into account the amount of radiation that will 
be incident on barriers and the length of time that individuals will be beyond the barrier in 
question. These calculations and parameters used within these calculations can be seen in section 
III.b.ii.  
The methods described in the NCRP reports are the methods relied upon by health 
physicists, medical physicists, and radiation specialists. If the correct formulae are chosen and 
the correct variables are applied, the calculated thicknesses will be an overestimate for the 
required radiation shielding. However, the factors chosen in the transmission factor formulae 
dictate the quality of your shielding, if the variables chosen do not take into account the full 
extent of the radiation, the calculated thicknesses will potentially be inadequate.  
b. MCNP approach 
MCNP (Monte Carlo N-Particle code) is a Monte Carlo code, which uses the Monte 
Carlo method for solving transport problems for nuclear engineering and other nuclear science 
problems. MCNP was first released in 1977, and was derived from work done at Los Alamos [4]. 
The version used in this project was MCNP5, which is accompanied by MCNP6 and MCNPX 
and is an export controlled software distributed by Los Alamos National Lab (LANL) and the 
Radiation Safety Information Computational Center (RSICC). 
The main function of MCNP is to solve transport problems. This is stated in the MCNP 
references (X-5, Volume I: Overview and Theory and Volume II: User’s Guide) [4,5]. One of the 
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reasons that this code was developed is to help solve the complex transport equations used in the 
nuclear sciences. This code is used extensively in the nuclear engineering field to solve complex 
transport problems in nuclear reactors; however, its capabilities lend themselves to a variety of 
aspects in the nuclear sciences, including: health physics, medical physics, detection, and 
spallation activities.  
This code offers a statistical representation of particle transport within materials, 
interactions of the incident particles, secondary particle generation, secondary particle 
interaction, and other transport information that would be difficult to observe and calculate 
without the computational power that this Monte Carlo code harnesses. 
MCNP input is a three part text document consisting of cells, surfaces, and data. Each 
section works with the others to create a cohesive model of a source, geometry, and detector to 
allow for the simulation of particle transport. In the surface section, geometrical boundaries 
(planes, cylinders, spheres, etc.) are placed within the “MCNP workspace”. Alone, these 
boundaries serve no purpose, but used together these boundaries are what are used to define 
cells, the building blocks for a transport geometry. Cells are the physical spaces in which 
particles are transported. The particle transport is governed by information contained within the 
data of the input. Here, materials, sources, tallies, conversions, and other data cards can be 
implemented. These data cards, when acting on the cells, allow for representative transport of the 
particles of interest.  
For shielding analysis, the geometry of interest, when tested through simulation, should 
show the required dose limits are met. For this to be done accurately; the geometry, source, and 
detectors must all be created to offer a representative reality for simulation. 
c. Comparison of Methods 
The NCRP analytical calculations and MCNP simulations were performed for different 
reasons. The methods described in the NCRP 144 and 151 reports offer a generalized way to 
calculate the necessary shielding based on a set of user specified coefficients and objectives. The 
NCRP analytical calculations are extremely useful if the extend of the radiation is known and 
consistent. Whereas, MCNP performs a complex particle simulation based on a specific 
geometry, utilizing tallies to find doses at a given location.  
The NCRP analytical method provides transmission factors that can then be turned into 
the number of tenth value layers to achieve the specified dose limit. From the number of tenth 
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value layers, a barrier thickness of a desired material can be calculated. The advantage of using 
the NCRP analytical methods is that it is allows the user to input those parameters that apply to 
their individual facility, including: how long the beam is on in a given week, how long people 
will be occupying adjacent facilities, how long the beam will be directed at a given wall, distance 
from beam to area to be protected, beam energy, amongst others. Given the appropriate 
parameters and the appropriate equations, the NCRP analytical methods give the user a simple, 
quick way to determine shielding thicknesses for radiation facilities. The disadvantage of using 
the NCRP analytical methods is that the method has an intrinsic overestimate of shielding. This 
overestimate of shielding is beneficial for ensuring the safe operation of a facility; however, 
more shielding translates into a higher construction cost.  
The MCNP simulations are particle simulations based off of a representative geometry of 
the facility in question. Unlike the general NCRP analytical method, the MCNP is a highly 
specific simulation that tracks both primary and secondary radiation through the specified 
geometry. The advantage of an MCNP simulation is in the accuracy of the calculation.  
However, this accuracy is a double edged sword. For the simulation to yield relevant results, a 
geometry and source term must be supplied that is representative enough of the actual facility 
and linear accelerator. The facility geometries can be fairly easily recreated in MCNP. And using 
resources such as the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory’s Compendium of Material 
Composition Data for Radiation Transport Modeling [6], the geometry can be created using the 
representative materials. It is the linear accelerator source term that can cause the error in dose 
results. If the source term is not modelled correctly, any dose results obtained from simulations 
will be subject to any differences between the simulated and actual accelerator. Thus it is 
paramount that any MCNP simulation run to verify that dose limits are not exceeded must be 
performed with the utmost care and by those with sufficient shielding and simulation experience. 
III. Computational Methods 
a. Design Considerations 
The goal of this project was to create a viable shielding option for a 22 MV linear 
accelerator and DT neutron generator. Due to time constraints, the shielding analysis was only 
verified for the linear accelerator; however, the design takes into account its implementation into 
the facility and offers margins in the floor plan for additional neutron shielding. Starting from the 
faculty suggested room layout seen in Figure 1, we had to decide which modifications to make to 
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the design that would best utilize the approximate 2000 sqft area. We started by talking with the 
faculty members that would be primarily involved in the usage of the room. From talks with 
faculty, it became evident that the facility design would need to be heavily altered. 
Due to the nuclear engineering department’s imaging and nonproliferation interests, the 
faculty has asked that the new physical security and linear accelerator facilities be designed such 
that large objects, such as shipping containers, can be brought into the facilities and imaged 
using an Eagle Portal imaging system. To allow for the large containers to be brought in, we 
decided to utilize a large direct access door measuring 16 ft high and 3.5 ft thick. The doorframe 
has a 15 ft clearance, that would allow for trucks to drive into the facility and be unloaded using 
a crane attached to the facility’s ceiling. To allow for the movement of the large cargo and the 
inclusion of a cargo crane, the ceiling of the facility also had to be of sufficient height. It was 
decided to use a 20 ft ceiling for both the linear accelerator and physical security facilities. 
Other requests by the faculty included the utilization of a collimation wall between the 
accelerator and physical security facilities. This collimation wall is a 3 ft thick wall with a 2 ft x 
2 ft square conduit centered laterally and located between 3 ft and 5 ft vertically. It was 
positioned laterally as to weigh lessen the leakage radiation on the outer wall (uncontrolled) and 
weight it more heavily toward the control room wall (controlled). It was placed between 3 ft and 
5 ft vertically as to create a realistic and useable accelerator height. The point of the collimation 
wall is to provide a place to add additional beam shaping devices on either side of the wall, such 
as lead collimation plates. As for the thickness of the collimation wall, it was decided on so that 
if the accelerator is placed directly adjacent to the collimation wall, only the photons created 
outside of the 15 degree off-axis primary beam would be collimated.  
From here, given the size limitations that were provided, we created areas to be protected. 
We attached occupancy factors, workloads, and relevant distances to each barrier. With these 
factors we calculated transmission factors and consequently barrier thicknesses. These 
calculations are in the following section (NCRP analytical calculation methods). After these 
calculations were performed, an MCNP simulation on the finalized geometry was performed to 
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b. NCRP analytical calculation methods 
i. NCRP assumptions 
The analytical methods described in NCRP reports 144 and 151 are intended for the use 
in shielding calculations for medical linear accelerators (NCRP 151) and various particle 
accelerators (NCRP 144). For the shielding calculations that were needed for this atypical 
project, certain assumptions had to be made including: the appropriate equation modifications, 
correct occupancy factors, necessary workload, limiting dose rates, and other factors. 
First, the decisions on which equations to use for the calculations had to be made. The 
bulk of the reference shielding materials was about medical linear accelerator shielding. Each 
reference, although similar, handled their variables slightly differently and were based on various 
assumptions. For the final calculations, equations were drawn from both reports [2,3], as well as 
from McGinley’s Shielding Techniques for Radiation Oncology Facilities [1]. The chosen 
equations can be found below under the NCRP calculations heading (Equations 1-3). 
Next were the decisions about equation variables, namely: occupancy factors, workload, 
and limiting dose rates. Occupancy factors (fraction of time that an area will be occupied during 
a given week) were decided upon by the type of area that was to be protected and ranged from 
1/20 for low traffic areas to 1 (full occupancy) for uncertain or possibly high traffic areas. With 
the occupancy factor decisions, caution was taken to over shield rather than under shield. Work 
load (amount of dose delivered to the isocenter during a given week) was decided to be 1000 
Gy/week for our accelerator facility. This number is higher than the 500-600 Gy/week 
recommended for typical facilities [2] because of the uncertainty in the amount of usage that the 
facility would get during a typical or atypical week. Finally, dose limits were assigned to barriers 
based on the occupants that could pass by or reside in the area beyond that barrier. These dose 
limits were taken to be 0.1 mSv/week for controlled areas and 0.02 mSv/week for uncontrolled 
areas and are based on NCRP recommendations and governing regulations [2,3,7]. 
  
   12 
 
ii. NCRP calculations 





      (1) 
Equation 1: Primary barrier transmission taken from NCRP 151 pg. 22 [3]. 
Bpri = Transmission factor for the primary barrier 
P = Shielding design goal (expressed in dose equivalent) beyond the barrier and is usually given 
for weekly time frame (Sv/week) 
dpri = Distance from the X-ray target to the point protected (m) 
W = Workload or photon absorbed dose delivered at 1 m from the x-ray target per week 
(Gy/week). 
- For medical accelerators, isocenter is assumed or calibrated to be 1 m. For the materials 
linear accelerator, the isocenter is not established. For the project, we assumed the 
irradiation material would be placed in the center of the room, approximately 15-16 ft 
away from the accelerator. 
U = Use factor or fraction of the workload that the primary beam is directed at the barrier in 
question. 
T = Occupancy factor for the protected location or fraction of the workweek that a person is 
present beyond the barrier. This location is usually assumed to be 0.3 m beyond the barrier in 
question. 
Table 1: Primary barrier 
transmission factor calculations 
T 0.6  




U 1  
P 0.0001 Sv/week 
Bpri 0.0000212  
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 In the primary barrier calculations, we had to consider factors relating to the critical 
facility. We assumed a conservative occupancy factor of 60% of the work week. This would take 
into account students or faculty working for a majority of the week in the facility. We also 
assumed a conservative workload of 1000 Gy/week. This workload is twice the workload 
recommended by the NCRP reports 144 and 151. The critical facility is also a radiation 
environment, thus we assumed it would be a controlled area, assigning it a dose limit of 0.1 
mSv/week. Finally we determined a distance for the area to be protected. Based on these 
parameters, a transmission factor was determined using equation 1. From the transmission factor, 
the number of tenth value layers and barrier thicknesses can be determined. For our primary 
barrier, we used a 7 ft thick concrete wall.  
2. Secondary Scatter Calculations [2] 




                       (2) 
Equation 2: Scatter transmission factor taken from NCRP 144 pg. 193-5 [2]. 
T(x) = Transmission factor for the shield barrier 
Hm = Maximal permissible dose-equivalent rate for the type of area (Sv/week) 
di = Distance to incident of scatter (m) 
ds = Distance from scatter to area to be protected (m) 
 = Differential dose albedo () 
- For our shielding analysis, we assumed a differential dose albedo of 5x10-3 [2]. 
A = Beam area of the scattering surface (m2) 
W = Workload or photon absorbed dose delivered at 1 m from the x-ray target per week 
(Gy/week). 
T = Occupancy factor for the protected location or fraction of the workweek that a person is 
present beyond the barrier. This location is usually assumed to be 0.3 m beyond the barrier in 
question. 
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Table 2: Secondary scatter 
calculations for the hallway 
adjacent to the facilities  
Table 3: Secondary scatter 
calculations for the large direct 
access door 
T 0.2   T 0.05  
W 1000 Gy/week  W 1000 Gy/week 
H 0.0001 Sv/week  H 0.00002 Sv/week 
di 
17 Ft  
Di 
17 Ft 
5.18 M  5.1816 M 
A 6.1 m2  A 6.1 m
2 
ds 
22 Ft  
Ds 
17.3 Ft 
6.71 M  5.27304 M 
alpha 0.005   Alpha 0.005  
T(x) or Bs 0.020   T(x) or Bs 0.009862  
n 1.700   N 2.006043  
tbar 
81.02 cm  
Tbar 
94.77 cm 
2.66 ft  3.11 ft 
 
Table 4: Secondary scatter 
calculations for wall adjacent to 
direct access door 
 Table 5: Secondary scatter 
calculations for ceiling of physical 
security room 
T 0.05   T 1  
W 1000 Gy/Week  W 1000 Gy/Week 
H 0.00002 Sv/week  H 0.00002 Sv/week 
di 
17 ft  
Di 
17 Ft 
5.1816 m  5.1816 M 
A 6.1 m2  A 6.1 m2 
ds 
13.8 ft  
Ds 
20.25 Ft 
4.20624 m  6.1722 M 
alpha 0.005   Alpha 0.005  
T(x) or Bs 0.006275   T(x) or Bs 0.000676  
n 2.202377   N 3.170315  
tbar 
103.607 cm  
Tbar 
147.1642 cm 
3.399178 ft  4.828221 ft 
 
 Secondary barriers are calculated using both secondary scatter and leakage radiation 
components. For the secondary scatter calculations, we focused on those walls that are beyond 
the collimation wall. This was done because the primary beam is directed through the radiation 
conduit. If radiation backscatters off a surface and back through the collimation wall, its impact 
on further shielding would be of a lower magnitude than leakage. Thus any major component of 
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secondary scatter will be restricted to areas beyond this conduit. The four major barriers that 
were calculated using secondary scatter equations were the large direct access door adjacent to 
the outside, the wall accompanying the large direct access door adjacent to the outside, the wall 
adjacent to the hallway, and the ceiling. 
 For calculation purposes we assumed that the ceiling and outside were uncontrolled areas 
(0.02 mSv/week), while the hallway was a controlled area (0.1 mSv/week). The hallway was 
considered controlled due to the multiple radiation facilities on the leve; if someone is going to 
be around these facilities, they should be badged and monitored. Occupancy factors ranged from 
5% to 100%. We assumed lower occupancies in transient areas and full occupancy in the area 
above, due to the uncertainty in what is going to be placed above. We assumed that scattering 
events would take place in the middle of the irradiation facility, along the central axis of the 
beam.  
 From these calculations, we obtained shielding thicknesses needed to protect against the 
secondary scatter radiation. These barrier thicknesses corresponded to concrete walls of: 2.7 ft 
for the hallway, 3.1 ft for the large direct access door, 3.4 ft for the outside wall, and 4.8 ft for 
the ceiling. However, these barrier thicknesses only take into account one secondary radiation 
component. Secondary leakage also needs to be considered in final barrier thicknesses.  





      (3) 
BL = Transmission factor for the shield barrier 
P = Shielding design goal (expressed in dose equivalent) beyond the barrier and is usually given 
for weekly time frame (Sv/week) 
dL = Distance travelled by leakage radiation 
W = Workload or photon absorbed dose delivered at 1 m from the x-ray target per week 
(Gy/week). 
T = Occupancy factor for the protected location or fraction of the workweek that a person is 
present beyond the barrier. This location is usually assumed to be 0.3 m beyond the barrier in 
question. 
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Table 6: Secondary leakage 
calculations for outside wall  
Table 7: Secondary leakage 
calculations for control room 
T 0.05   T 0.666667  
W 1000 Gy/week  W 1000 Gy/week 
P 0.00002 Sv/week  P 0.0001 Sv/week 
dL 
13.8 ft  
dL 
12 ft 
4.20624 m  3.6576 m 
BL 0.007077   BL 0.002007  
n 2.1501519   n 2.697516  
tbar 
101.25684 cm  
tbar 
125.8882 cm 
3.3220747 ft  4.130191 ft 
 
Table 8: Secondary leakage 
calculations for wall behind 
accelerator 
 Table 9: Secondary leakage 
calculations for ceiling in 
accelerator room 
T 0.13   T 1  
W 1000 Gy/week  W 1000 Gy/week 
P 0.0001 Sv/week  P 0.00002 Sv/week 
dL 
26.5 ft  
dL 
20.25 ft 
8.0772 m  6.1722 m 
BL 0.052193   BL 0.000762  
n 1.282388   n 3.11809  
tbar 
62.20748 cm  
tbar 
144.8141 cm 
2.040928 ft  4.751117 ft 
 
 Along with secondary scatter, secondary leakage radiation must also be considered when 
defining shielding thicknesses. For secondary leakage components, we focused on those walls 
behind the collimation wall, in the direction opposite the primary beam. Leakage radiation comes 
off of the accelerator head, we assumed that any forward directed leakage radiation would be 
absorbed or greatly reduced by the collimation wall. Limiting the major leakage radiation 
shielding components to the outside wall adjacent to the accelerator room, wall behind the 
accelerator, accelerator control room wall, and ceiling. 
 For calculation purposes, we assumed that the room behind the accelerator and control 
room were controlled areas (0.1 mSv/week) and that above the ceiling and outside were 
uncontrolled areas (0.02 mSv/week). We assumed occupancy of 13% for the room behind the 
accelerator, 67% for the accelerator control room, 5% for outside, and 100% for the area above 
the ceiling.  
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From these calculations, we obtained shielding thicknesses needed to protect against the 
secondary leakage radiation. These barrier thicknesses corresponded to concrete walls of: 2.1 ft 
for the room behind the accelerator, 4.1 ft for the control room, 3.3 ft for the outside wall, and 
4.8 ft for the ceiling. However, these barrier thicknesses only take into account one secondary 
radiation component. Secondary scatter, calculated above, also needs to be considered in final 
barrier thicknesses. 
4. Tenth Value Layers [3] 
n = - log(B)       (4) 
Based on transmission factors obtained from Equations 1-3, the number of tenth value layers 
(TVL) required to reach the specified dose limits can be determined using Equation 4. 
5. Barrier Thicknesses [3] 
tbar = TVL1 + (n – 1)TVLeq      (5) 
Once the necessary tenth value layers are found, barrier thickness can be determined based on 
tenth value layers of the target shielding material. For photon shielding, the main shielding 
material for primary and secondary barriers is concrete. Tenth value layers vary from reference 
to reference. For our shielding analysis we used regular concrete walls ( = 2.35 g/cm3) with 
tenth value layers of 49.5 cm and 45 cm, for first and equilibrium tenth value layers respectively. 
6. Secondary Barrier Remarks 
Secondary barriers are impacted by secondary scatter and leakage. If the thickness of the barrier 
is approximately the same for each secondary component (scatter and leakage), it is 
recommended that 1 half value layer (HVL) is added to the larger of the two barrier thicknesses. 
If the two thicknesses differ by a TVL or more, the larger thickness is used for the barrier. This is 
referred to as the two source rule [3]. For our accelerator facility, the two components are 
approximately the same, thus we used the larger and added 1 HVL to determine the shielding 
thickness. For regular concrete, we determined [3] a HVL to be 15cm. 
7. Neutron Considerations 
Since the accelerator used in our shielding design is a 22 MV accelerator (above the binding 
energy of nucleons), photon neutrons will be produced. Thus neutrons will also play a part in the 
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shielding considerations. If the material used in the primary barrier is concrete, then the barrier 
will absorb both the produced photoneutrons and neutron capture gamma rays, without the need 
for additional barriers [3]. After considering this accepted guideline for primary barriers, we 
extended the rule to all secondary barriers including the primary door which is predominantly 
concrete. If a barrier is not concrete, further neutron considerations must be taken into account. 
For our shielding analysis, this included the considerations for the control room door and neutron 
generator cover. 
8. Door and DT Generator Cover Calculations [4] 
For areas that need to be shielded but require access like doors and conduits, concrete is 
not the best material to used, because of the thicknesses or more importantly volumes required. 
For these, a laminated barrier is typically used to allow for thinner shielding and to stop both the 
incoming photon and neutron radiation. 
 
Figure 3: Example of a laminated shielding door composed of lead, 
polyethylene, and borated polyethylene (BPE). Shown in the figure is the 
laminated door and additional strips of BPE and lead on the threshold to 
shield against radiation that misses the laminated door [2]. 
 
For our project, we took this recommendation of materials and did a slight adaptation. 
Instead of using lead, polyethylene, and borated polyethylene, we decided to use steel, lead, and 
borated polyethylene. The steel was used to add structure. The high-Z metals (steel and lead) 
were selected to create inelastic collisions with photoneutrons and provide photon attenuation. 
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The borated polyethylene was used to slow and absorb the photoneutrons. The stacking of lead 
and steel on both sides of the BPE was to: on the front, offer the inelastic neutron collisions and 
incoming photon attenuation and on the back, offer additional photon attenuation from capture 
gamma rays. Below is a breakdown of the control room door and neutron hole cover 
calculations. Because of the similar TVL requirements, we elected to use the same material 
thicknesses on each. 
 
Control Room Door 
Table 10: Secondary leakage 
calculations for the control room 
door 
T 0.666667  
W 1000 Gy/week 




BL 0.005574  
n 2.253819  
 
Steel TVL = 11cm 
Lead TVL = 5.5cm 
Borated Polyethylene 5% (BPE) TVL = 8.5cm 
Used thicknesses 
Steel = 1.27cm and 2.54cm 
Lead = 15.2cm 
BPE = 30.5cm 
Construction from back to front 
Steel = 0.635cm 
Lead = 7.6cm 
BPE = 30.5cm 
Lead = 7.6cm 
Steel = 0.635cm 
Surround Material (Top, bottom, and sides) 
Steel = 2.54cm 
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Threshold shielding strips 
BPE = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (facing radiation area) 
Lead = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (along inside of threshold) 
Control Room Door Dimensions 
8 feet tall x 6.5 feet wide x 1.54 feet thick 
Or 
2.44 m tall x 1.98 m wide x 0.47 m thick 
Neutron Generator Cover 
Table 11: Secondary scatter 
calculations for the neutron hole 
cover calculations 
T 0.666667  
W 1000 Gy/Week 








Alpha 0.005  
Bs 0.004943  
N 2.306044  
 
Steel TVL = 11cm 
Lead TVL = 5.5cm 
Borated Polyethylene 5% (BPE) TVL = 8.5cm 
Used thicknesses 
Steel = 1.27cm and 2.54cm 
Lead = 15.2cm 
BPE = 30.5cm 
Construction from back to front 
Steel = 0.635cm 
Lead = 7.6cm 
BPE = 30.5cm 
Lead = 7.6cm 
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Steel = 0.635cm 
Surround Material (Top, bottom, and sides 
Steel = 2.54cm 
Threshold shielding strips 
BPE = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (facing radiation area) 
Lead = 5cm thick and 30cm wide (along inside of threshold) 
 
Neutron Hole Cover Dimensions 
3 feet tall x 3 feet wide x 1.54 feet thick (centered at 5 ft height) 
Or  
0.91 tall x 0.91 m wide x 0.47 m thick (centered at 5 ft height) 
 
9. Wall Thicknesses 
Wall thicknesses were determined based on the primary, scatter, and leakage calculations 
recommended by the NCRP reports 144 and 151. These reports offer varied forms of equations, 
constants, and tenth value layers. Thus there is some subjectivity to the actual calculations that 
are used in each analytical solution. For our calculations, we justified the most reasonable 
equations and constants (Equations 1-6) and tried to provide conservative estimates on factors 
such as occupancy factor, workload, distance to interaction, etc. From the results of these 
calculations and additional considerations such as the two source rule, we determined wall 
thicknesses that were deemed suitable for use in the facility. Below is a to-scale representation of 
the facility (Figure 4), labelled with relevant shielding areas, along with a compiled table of used 
wall thicknesses (Table 12). For a larger to-scale drawing with dimensions, see Appendix b. 
  




Figure 4: Drafted geometry based on NCRP calculations with labelled walls. 
 
Table 12: Finalized barrier thicknesses used in facility design 
Wall ID and Description Concrete Thickness 
A. Primary Barrier 7ft / 2.13m 
B. Hallway 3.1ft / 0.95m 
C. Large Access Door 
3.5ft / 1.07m 
(0.635 cm steel surround) 
D. Door Access Area 3ft / 0.91m 
E. Outer Wall 3.8ft / 1.16m 
F. Collimation Wall 3ft / 0.91m 
G. Control Room 
(Accelerator room) 
4.5ft / 1.37m 
H. Control Room  
(Physical Security room) 
5ft / 1.52m 
I. Back Wall  
(Accelerator room) 
2.5ft / 0.76m 
J. Back Wall (Control room) 3ft / 0.91m 
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Figure 5: CAD renders of room geometry derived from NCRP analytical calculations that was used in 
MCNP simulations  
 
c. MCNP simulation of planned room design 
i. MCNP geometry 
From the dimensions determined from the NCRP analytical methods, a full-scale MCNP 
geometry was created to perform particle simulations on. This allowed for a particle physics 
based simulation based on individual geometry and materials to investigate dose rates at select 
areas of the geometry based on the tallies and response functions that are chosen. 
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Figure 6.1: Top view of MCNP geometry taken at 5 ft from the 
floor of the facility, showing locations of tally cells 
 
Figure 6.2: Side view of MCNP geometry taken parallel to the 
photon beam conduit, showing the height of the floor tally cells 
and the location of the ceiling tally cell. 
 
ii. MCNP source term 
To accurately obtain dose results, a representative source was developed. Instead of both 
accelerator shielding group spending precious time developing the source term, the source term 
was developed by our partner group Accelerator Shielding 1 and verified by both groups. Two 
source terms were developed: one for photons produced by the 22 MeV electron beam from the 




6 4 5 
7 
2 
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To start a 22 MeV electron beam was simulated on a 2 mm thick, 5 cm radius tungsten 
disk. This size of target was chosen based on personal experience from viewing a tungsten target, 
from contacting experts in the field about the size, and reading papers. This simple geometry was 
set between two “infinite” planes. The two planes were tallied for both photons and neutrons, 
creating energy and directional dependent distributions. These distributions were then used to 
create two equivalent point charge source terms that are dependent on energy and direction. 
Figures 7 and 8 show a visual representation of select energy groups for both source terms. 
 
Figure 7: Source term representation for 
 21-22 MeV photons 
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Figure 8: Source term representation of  
13-14 MeV neutrons  
 
 Two source terms were needed due to the high energy beam’s capability to produce 
photoneutrons. For any beam energy above approximately 7 MeV (above the nuclear binding 
energy), there is a chance of “knocking out” a neutron. Having both of these sources of primary 
radiation and being able to track their journey along with any subsequent secondary radiation 
allows for a representative simulation of the linear accelerator and physical security facilities. 
Upon subsequent conversion, dose rates can be determined.  
iii. MCNP dose conversion 
For this project we were tasked with producing a floor plan that would shield the users 
and public from radiation exceeding the limits set by governing regulatory bodies. In Tennessee, 
the state governs the regulation or radiation dose limits. Regulatory dose limits are almost 
exclusively given in dose equivalent rates (Sieverts/hour, Sieverts/week, Sieverts/year, etc.). To 
get usable dose rates from MCNP to compare against regulatory limits, some type of data 
manipulation must be made. This can be done in a number of different ways, utilizing dose 
maps, anthropomorphic phantoms, or response functions. For our MCNP simulations, we chose 
to set up tally cells and utilize response functions on the simulated volume averaged fluxes (F4).  
Our tally cells were placed at high risk areas or the most probable points of failure. We 
selected thirteen areas to tally. These were placed inside the irradiation area, in the hallway 
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adjacent to the irradiation area (verifying wall B in Figure 4), behind the primary wall in line 
with the neutron generator conduit (verifying wall A in Figure 4), beyond the large access door 
(verifying door C in Figure 4), in the control room (verifying walls G and H in Figure 4, as well 
as the control room door), and in the ceiling (verifying dose to occupants above are properly 
shielded). From the tally results generated by these cells, we applied response functions taken 
from ANS-6.1.1-1977 to get dose rates to compare against regulations [4]. To get accurate dose 
rates we had to multiply each dose rate by a factor corresponding to electron beam intensity. 
Based on simulations and judgement calls, we used two beam intensities corresponding to a low 
and high estimate beam intensity for a reasonable min and max dose rate. It is important to say at 
this point that these values are representative of a high powered beam. This beam will not be 
used continuously, but for select, short irradiations.  
Table 13: Neutron Flux-to-Dose rate conversion 
factors for MCNP from ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1977 [4] 




Quality Factor  
2.5E–08 3.67E–06 2 
1.0E–07 3.67E–06 2 
1.0E–06 4.46E–06 2 
1.0E–05 4.54E–06 2 
1.0E–04 4.18E–06 2 
1.0E–03 3.76E–06 2 
1.0E–02 3.56E–06 2.5 
1.0E–01 2.17E–05 7.5 
5.0E–01 9.26E–05 11 
1 1.32E–04 11 
2 1.43E–04 9.3 
2.5 1.25E–04 9 
5 1.56E–04 8 
7 1.47E–04 7 
10 1.47E–04 6.5 
14 2.08E–04 7.5 
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Table 14: Photon Flux-to-Dose rate conversion factors 
for MCNP taken from ANSI/ANS 6.1.1-1977 [4] 
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Table 15: MCNP hourly dose rates corrected for beam intensity. 
Area of interest numbers correspond to tally cell ID numbers 
identified in Figures 6.1 and 6.2. 
Area of Interest 
Low estimate for 
MCNP dose rates 
(mrem/hr) 
High estimate for 
MCNP dose rates 
(mrem/hr) 
1. Critical Facility 9.48E-03 7.96E+00 
2. Outside 1.19E-02 1.00E+01 
3. Hallway 1.98E-02 1.66E+01 
4. Mid Control Room 9.34E-05 7.85E-02 
5. Left Control Room 7.09E-05 5.95E-02 
6. Right Control Room 1.14E-04 9.60E-02 
7. Accelerator Room 1.77E+01 1.48E+04 
8. Ceiling 2.41E-04 2.03E-01 
  
Table 16: MCNP weekly dose rates corrected for weekly usage (40 
hours/week) and area occupational factors. 
Area of interest 
Low estimate for 
 MCNP dose rates  
(mSv/wk) 
High estimate for 
MCNP dose rates  
(mSv/wk) 
1. Critical Facility 0.0023 1.9115 
2. Outside 0.0002 0.2 
3. Hallway 0.0016 1.3271 
4. Mid Control Room 0 0.0209 
5. Left Control Room 0 0.0159 
6. Right Control Room 0 0.0256 
7. Accelerator Room 4.7067 3952.7528 
8. Classes Above 0.0001 0.0811 
 
IV. Methods for Obtaining a Cost Estimate 
Cost estimates on facilities are hard to determine based on: the uniqueness of the project, 
cost of labor, materials, and possible changes proposed by experts and architects. However, 
certain estimates can be made, specifically estimates based on the cost per volume of concrete 
and costs of renting a crane, which would be required for construction. Radiation shielding 
experts were also contacted to provide estimates for ventilation, possible labor costs, surveying, 
and radiation monitors. 
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Materials 
Concrete = $160/m3 
Approximate concrete volume = 1500 m3 
Estimated cost = $240,000 
 
Crane (75 Ton) = $200/hour + $700 travel  
 
Large Direct Access Door = $200,000 
 
HEPA ventilation = $14,000 
 
Labor = $750,000 
Health physics work 
Certified health physicist = $125 /hr 
Health physics technician = $60 /hr 
Radiation area monitors = $50,000 
Total health physics estimate = $75,000 
 
Total Project Estimate 
$1,500,000-$2,000,000 
 
 These prices are estimated costs Cost estimates were estimated through contacting 
multiple resources, including: architects, shielding experts, medical physicists, and radiation 
engineers. These are conservative estimates based on expertise in the field. In reality, 
construction rates would be lumped into the cost of the entire engineering complex that would be 
sent out and bid on by various construction firms. 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
In the coming years, the nuclear engineering department will be expanding. A part of this 
expansion is a proposed new building. This state-of-the-art building will incorporate multiple 
research laboratories. Three of these laboratories include a linear accelerator facility, physical 
security laboratory, and graphite pile/critical facility. The design of physical security laboratory 
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and linear accelerator facility along with considerations regarding the affiliated critical facility is 
described in this project report. For this design project, we have:  
 consulted faculty members about facility requirements 
 contacted professionals in the field about design considerations and methods 
 determined a viable facility layout 
 performed analytical calculations for shielding thicknesses using methods laid out 
by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements reports 144 
and 151 
 ran particle simulations of the source and geometry using MCNP  
 determined facility factors such as materials costs and auxiliary equipment.  
From talks with faculty members about the function of the facility, design parameters 
were determined. The design that was achieved allows for the utilization of two radiation 
sources, a 22 MV linear accelerator and DT neutron generator. This was done to allow lower 
energy radiation sources to be used such as the 9 MV accelerator planning to be used by the 
department, while allowing for higher energy and more diverse radiation sources to be utilized in 
the future. Also taken into consideration was the ability to bring in large objects in to the facility 
through the large direct access door. The combined facilities (linear accelerator and physical 
security) measures 35.8 ft x 64 ft including barriers and active floor space, not including the 
large direct access door. The facility is designed with 20 ft ceilings set between a 5 ft thick 
concrete ceiling and 10 ft thick concrete floor. The calculations for barrier thicknesses can be 
found in section III.b.ii. The barriers that were calculated ranged from 2.8 ft to 7ft thick. The 
method used to determine the shielding thicknesses takes into account various factors of the 
facility: what is beyond the barrier, intensity of the beam, energy of the beam, distance to the 
barrier, and the material of the barrier, to name a few [2,3]. From these calculations we established 
a floorplan to use in our design. A detailed floor plan with dimensions can be seen in appendix b. 
Visual representations of the facility can be seen throughout the report but namely in Figures 2 
and 5. 
From the established floorplan, an MCNP geometry was built including the correct 
dimensions and materials (Figure 6). To accompany this representative geometry, a 
representative source term was created to allow for an accurate particle simulation to be run 
(Figures 7 and 8). After creation, the simulations were run tracking photons, photoneutrons, and 
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neutron capture gamma rays, specifically their fluxes incident on tally cells. From the fluxes 
recorded by the tally cells, conversions must be performed both during and after simulations. 
Response functions were applied during simulation to convert fluxes to dose rates in mrem/hour. 
After simulations, these dose rates were then weighted with source intensities to get 
representative dose rates (Table 15). The minimum dose rates reported in this table all fall within 
the regulatory hourly limit set by the State of Tennessee and the NRC [7] (2 mrem/hour for 
uncontrolled areas and 10 mrem/hour for controlled areas). The maximum dose rates fall inside 
the hourly dose rates for the most part, falling outside for the hallway and beyond the large direct 
access door.  
After hourly dose rates were determined, we converted the hourly dose rates into weekly 
dose rates. This was done by first converting the mrem/hour into mSv/hour and then multiplying 
by the work hours in a week and occupation factors for the various areas to be protected to get 
weighted weekly dose rates (mSv/week). These dose rates can be seen in Table 16. According to 
the governing bodies, the weekly dose rates limits are 0.02mSv/week for uncontrolled areas and 
0.1 mSv/week for controlled areas. If you look at the high estimate for MCNP dose rate, several 
areas are above regulatory limit. This estimate is based off a beam intensity that was higher than 
used in our analytical calculations. If you look at the low estimate for MCNP dose rate, all areas 
are below regulatory limit. In reality, the beam intensity would be between these two estimates, 
falling within regulatory limits. 
This deviation from regulatory limits using a high beam intensity estimate is expected. If 
an accelerator ran at full power for a full business week, the necessary shielding would be 
outrageous.  A linear accelerator typically runs for short intervals with breaks in between. When 
doing the first order analytical calculations, we were directed by the NCRP reports which give 
conservative parameters relevant to medical linear accelerator facilities [2,3]. These parameters 
were used because of a lack of parameters related directly to our facility. If the needs of the 
faculty require for extended and consistent irradiation times, then a revised set of NCRP 
calculations would need to be done given updated facility parameters. This increase in beam 
intensity will result in thicker barriers. 
Our facility design was created to be as user friendly as possible. Due to the size of the 
facility, large scale as well as small scale experiments can be undertaken. Due to the shielding, a 
high powered 22 MV accelerator can be used. With this high energy shielding taken into 
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consideration, any lower energy accelerator could be used, specifically the 9 MV linear 
accelerator that is intended to be included in the new nuclear engineering building. The facility 
that was designed throughout the course of this project should easily meet the standards set by 
the state of Tennessee and NRC given a moderate amount of use. It should also meet the needs 
of the nuclear engineering department, as described by those faculty directly involved in the 
daily usage of the facilities in question. 
VI. Future work 
a. Neutron generator considerations 
Along with the linear accelerator, the nuclear engineering department would like to add a 
DT neutron generator. This neutron generator would allow for material’s damage to be 
investigated along with neutron imaging to be performed. This additional radiation source would 
increase the radiation fluence in and beyond the facility, thus more shielding would need to be 
investigated. Due to time constraints within the project, this shielding was not investigated. 
However, the placement of the radiation source was taken into account along with additional 
room for shielding to be modified. 
Due to the primary neutron source, the shielding would need to be of substantial 
thickness to allow for the probability of interaction to increase. Additionally, the inclusion of a 
high Z material on the surfaces of walls, such as a lead sheet, could aid in inducing inelastic 
collisions. These inelastic collisions reduce the neutron’s energy, greatly reducing the amount of 
needed shielding. For the purposes of this facility, we recommend adding lead sheets to the 
inside of walls H and B in Figure 4 and adjusting wall thicknesses to shield the additional source 
of radiation. Shielding will also need to be verified for the graphite pile/critical facility.  
b. Faculty optimization 
The facility that we have designed in the course of this project was a best guess estimate 
based on the faculty design (Figure 1) and talks with faculty members about individual desires 
for the design of the facilities. These individual desires include the large direct access door, high 
ceilings, collimation wall, large imaging array, dual radiation sources, and the option to utilize a 
higher energy linear accelerator. 
Throughout the course of the project, desires changed and new desires came to light. We 
did our best to accommodate all of these design parameters; however, it would be necessary for 
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the faculty to identify all of the parameters that the facility must satisfy and adjust the design to 
fit these needs. 
c. Auxiliary Equipment and Considerations 
i. Ventilation 
A high power linear accelerator can produce many toxic and radioactive gases (13N, 15O, 
ozone, nitric oxide, nitrogen dioxide, nitrogen trioxide, etc.) while running routinely in pure 
oxygen. The higher the power of the linear accelerator the more these gases will be produced. 
Thus, the ventilation system should be designed for a 22 MV accelerator. Ozone (O3) has the 
greatest concern of hazard due to it being the most toxic and it reacts with nitric acid to form 
oxides of nitrogen which can corrode the equipment in the linear accelerator facility or the linear 
accelerator itself. Ozone has a production rate of 13 molecules per 100 eV [8]. Due to these 
effects, it is important to have a proper ventilation and monitoring system to discharge these 
gases. The ventilation system should use labyrinth ventilator pipelines, which provides 
continuous ventilation for the ozone being produced. Lastly, the concentration of these gases 
inside the facility should be monitored in the control room to guarantee a safe environment to the 
radiological workers entering the linear accelerator room [8,9]. 
ii. Cabling 
Cabling is a necessity in any research facility to support the machines and measurement 
equipment. Due to the amount of cabling and the need for occupational safety, cables must be 
managed. This is usually done with either a cable ditch dug into the floor and covered, cable 
ducts, cable tray attached to the ceiling, or through temporary covers [9].  
iii. Temperature and humidity 
The linear accelerator and physical security rooms must be maintained between 5C and 
35C and below a maximum 90% humidity (information corresponds to 15MV Varian Linatron 
K15) [10]. This is done so that the linear accelerator and affiliated equipment, such as the power 
supply, do not get overheated or too wet. For the purpose of these facilities and their direct 
access to the outside an air conditioner, heater, and dehumidifier are all going to be needed [9]. 
iv. Other factors to be considered  
Beyond these more general concerns needed for the operation of any linear accelerator 
facility, specific factors must be addressed for each individual facility including: safety 
interlocks, power requirements, lighting system, crane, amongst others [9]. These factors are 
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dependent on: the type of linear accelerator selected, the size of the finalized facility, the 
geometry of the finalized facility. Due to time constraints and the possibility that the room layout 
will change with further faculty optimization and shielding verification, we have elected to not 
go into detail in these systems but mention the necessity for considering them in any future 
design modification. 
d. Shielding verification 
In the event that this design is considered for use or adapted for use in the plan of the 
proposed nuclear engineering building, a shielding professional would need to be commissioned 
to perform a shielding calculation to verify and correct shielding dimensions. These calculations 
and verifications could be undertaken by departmental faculty adept in shielding, adjunct 
medical physics faculty that have shielding experience, or shielding venders. 
e. Architectural modification 
Where a normal building would need to take into account the expertise of one specialty, a 
radiation facility must take into account multiple to account for the design, functionality, and 
safety. At the time of design by the architect, there needs to be considerable cooperation between 
the shielding expert commissioned to undertake the shielding verification and the architect 
commissioned to design the building. Each of these professionals is concerned with different 
aspects of a building design. The shielding professional is concerned with the functionality of the 
building, namely the ease of use and the effectiveness of the shielding. Whereas the architect is 
concerned with the aesthetics and flow of the building. If changes are made to the room layout 
that does not directly follow the shielding verified by the expert, there will be a possibility that 
the shielding is insufficient. For instance, if a wall is pulled closer to the source without adjusting 
the shielding, the radiation transmission will be greater due to radiation’s 
1
𝑟2
 dose fall off. To 
achieve an effective design, both must be consulted about any changes that each needs to make.   
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b. Large Floor Plan with Dimensions 
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